subset of the economy earned very large profits and received government favoritism that grew over time. 1 In sum, we provide a two-sector re-interpretation of the growth-accounting results. Output and capital intensity rose in the favored sector, where technology growth was abysmal. Since this sector received large quantities of foreign direct investment, our results suggest that policies designed to lure FDI did not, in fact, raise overall TFP through technology transfer.
I. Primal and Dual Measures of Productivity
With consistent accounting data, primal and dual TFP are identical. With independent quantity and price data for the NIEs, however, they look substantially different. This section discusses the identities as well as a simple economic environment, with market distortions, in which the two measures might differ.
A. Manipulating Accounting Identities
The national accounts identity states that nominal output PY equals nominal factor income. One can force the identity to hold by defining payments to capital as a residual, PY WL − . P is the price deflator, Y is real output, W is the nominal wage, and L is total labor input. Conceptually, measured payments to capital include required payments RK-where R is the implicit rental cost (or user cost) and K is capital input-plus any pure profits (or losses) Π . We provide economic definitions of R and Π below. Thus:
For any variable J, let ĵ be the percent change, dJ/J . ( / ) r k π + is growth in residual payments to capital; we combine R and Π /K because, with only accounting data, we cannot distinguish them. s L is labor's share in output, / WL PY . The residual capital share is then (1-s L ). Totally differentiating (1) yields ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . Rearranging shows that "primal" TFP growth-output growth less share-weighted input growth-equals a "dual" weighted average of real factor price growth: 2 1 Can we be sure that neither Young nor Hsieh made large errors in their calculations? Young's primal data match up well with the "official" data on output and labor input; capital input growth recomputed from the underlying investment data also line up well. We re-examined Hsieh's sources and calculations and are not aware of major errors (though we interpret his results differently). In particular, the national accounts show a rapid increase in the capital-output ratio of about three percent per year, whereas reasonable user-cost estimates are flat. Feenstra and Reinsdorf (2003) consider whether stochastic tastes or technologies could lead to large standard errors in the dual. They conclude that if one compares Young and Hsieh's results for periods of 15 years or longer, the differences are statistically significant. This is consistent with our explanation that Hsieh correctly measured capital costs for the subset of the economy that he observed. Barro (1999) also discusses possible interpretations of the dual-primal discrepancy for the national accounts. 2 Henceforth, for convenience we often use TFP to refer to its growth rate. When possible, we omit time subscripts.
Thus, if identity (1) holds, then primal and dual TFP are identical. But one can estimate the dual with independent factor-price data. Hsieh (2002) , in particular, finds measures of real interest rates i t for the NIEs and calculates Hall-Jorgenson (1967) Table 2 shows this decomposition with data from Young (1995 Young ( , 1998 and Hsieh (2002) . Lines 1 to 3
show the items on the right side of equation (3); lines 4a and 4b show primal and dual TFP growth. Lines 5 and 6, respectively, show the contribution of wages and capital payments to the dual-primal difference. Tables 1 and 2 show that the primal and dual differ markedly only in Singapore and Taiwan. Wages play a sizeable role in Singapore and account for the bulk of the difference in Taiwan. Hsieh (2002) has little discussion of the role of wages. 5 We view the wage discrepancies as largely a measurement issue; in what Discrete-time Tornquist indices approximate the continuous time identity. In BLS data for U.S. TFP (1948 TFP ( -2002 , the approximation error between the primal and the dual is negligible, so we continue to treat equation (2) as an identity. 3 Hsieh (2002) and Young (1995 Young ( , 1998 provide estimates of real factor price growth only. For notational simplicity, we assume the primal and dual use the same output deflator, so that differences are the same in real or nominal terms. 4 Hsieh allows for multiple types of capital and labor (see Hsieh 2002, pp505-506) directly, so he doesn't need to benchmark to aggregate compensation. Implicitly, two factors "explain" the wage differences. First, Hsieh's survey data have less growth in employment than the official tabulations and he implicitly has less labor quality growth than Young (1995) ; for given growth in nominal compensation, these factors imply faster wage growth. Second, Hsieh's figures on total labor compensation rises from 25 percent of GDP in 1973 to 37 percent of GDP in 1990. Hence, his show larger growth in nominal labor compensation.. Young (1998) questions the reliability of Hsieh's wage data.
follows, we focus on economic or conceptual issues raised by capital's contribution, line 6. In Singapore, capital account for most (1.6 percentage points) of the dual-primal gap. The puzzle is that weak primal TFP performance implies sharp declines in capital returns, but estimated user-costs are flat.
B. A two-sector economic framework with profits and user-cost heterogeneity
We now discuss a simple economic environment in which, because of pure profits and capital-cost heterogeneity, the primal and dual might yield different results. We consider a partial equilibrium environment with two firms, indexed by i = F or U (ultimately, "favored" and "unfavored") that seek to maximize shareholder wealth. We abstract from uncertainty or factor adjustment costs.
Capital K and labor L are homogeneous, with
Cobb-Douglas production function,
, where A i,t is the firm's technology. Equity-financed firms seek to maximize the present discounted value of cash flow. Cash flow each period is revenue net of wages, capital expenditures, and net taxes paid: 
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real interest rate between t-1 and t (with i 0 ≡0), again defined in terms of the numeraire q, so that
is the firm's discount rate from period 0 to period t. We assume perfect foresight and write the problem:
Max W 1 (1 )( ) (1 )
s.t.
(1 ) , and given
6 With constant tax rates, this formulation is equivalent to allowing firms to deduct depreciation each period against 6
The first-order condition for labor yields the standard condition that the output elasticity is a markup , i t μ over the share of payments to labor in total revenue, .
Li t s (see, e.g., Hall 1990): 
(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 )
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, then the user cost takes the familiar Hall-Jorgenson (1967) form:
The user cost is the implicit rental cost of using a dollar of capital for one period. It is thus capital's counterpart to the wage. The firm must earn an after-tax return to cover interest plus depreciation. All else equal, with a higher tax rate firms must earn a higher pre-tax return to compensate shareholders, raising the user cost. The purchase price of capital is effectively As before, we define primal TFP as: income before paying taxes. D i,t is the present value of these deductions. 7 We abstract here from many of the rich considerations facing firms in their optimization decisions. Auerbach (1983) and Hassett and Hubbard (2002) survey the voluminous literature on the user cost. Personal taxes are also a source of capital taxes but do not directly impact growth-accounting as long as firms take the interest rate as given. We have abstracted from property taxes. These were unimportant in Korea and Hong Kong, and appear to have moved over time with corporate tax rates in Singapore and Taiwan; see Asher (1989) and Tanzi and Shome (1992) .
, ,
Equations (6) and (7) Hall (1990) , equation (9) shows at an industry level that using factor shares in cost would correctly give output elasticities; but shares in revenue do not.
We define instantaneous profits as any revenue that remains after paying for labor and capital:
follows that the last term in (9) If the value of the firm's output equals the value of the firm's inputs (with capital payments as a residual), then the derivation of equation (2) applies, so that primal and dual firm-level TFP are equal. Thus, if primal TFP does not measure technology change, then neither does dual TFP.
To relate technology to the dual, we can, as before, differentiate i i would not equal technology change unless either the profit share or profit-share growth equals zero.
C. Implications for Measurement
Hsieh (2002) recognizes that taxes, subsidies, and profits might matter but assumes they do not. He also assumes that all firms face the same user cost. In our model, these factors are potentially important. 
The first term captures the representativeness of ˆU r . 
. This is the continuous-time analogue to discrete-time chain-weighting. Since the two firms have Cobb-Douglas production functions, we find: 
where Ermisch and Huff (1999) claim that government SBs charged artificially high prices for public utilities and telecom to earn monopoly profits.
The Singapore Economic Committee (1986) indicates that monopoly pricing by SBs raised the cost of doing business and makes the policy recommendation that SB tariffs be reduced. Consistent with this monopolypricing view, the current surpluses of commercially-oriented SBs (included in national accounting profits) averaged 13 percent of GDP from 1975 -1984 and 10 percent from 1985 -1988 . Ramirez and Tan (2004 report that listed GLCs have statistically significantly higher q-ratios than other listed firms.
Singapore's active enticement of FDI also led to large profits. From 1972 to 1990, Singapore generated FDI inflows averaging almost ¼ of gross fixed capital formation by offering a wide range of incentives that reduced production costs. Singapore figures prominently in the literature on tax havens: "low-tax jurisdictions that provide investors opportunities for tax avoidance" (Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2006) . Firms might locate intangible assets in Singapore or else adjust internal transfer prices to realize high profits there.
Indeed, the average tax rate for U.S. multinationals in Singapore is consistently among the lowest in the world -about 30 percentage points below the unweighted mean in 1983, for example. Such profit shifting, as well as other subsidies that reduced operating costs, would lead to large economic profits.
GLCs, SBs, and multinationals also had user costs of capital that likely differed from other firms.
Special treatment (investment subsidies in our model) included direct government financing, artificially high credit worthiness (creditors assumed the government would bail out bad performers), and political connections. 10 A major benefit was subsidized land access. Under the Land Acquisition Act, the government had authority to purchase land at its 1973 market price, which it leased to industrialists at rates that reflected the low acquisition price. As land prices rose, the value of the land subsidy grew more valuable.
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Many preferences are firm-specific and unquantifiable. 12 But changes in tax law are observable. Major, legislative changes took place under the Economic Expansion Incentives (Relief from Income Tax) Act. The 1967 Act (as amended in 1970) gave so-called "pioneer firms" a five-year tax holiday, i.e., a tax rate of zero.
In 1975, the tax-holiday period was extended to 10 years. In 1984, pioneer status was extended to selected service firms. In 1987, Singapore reduced the tax rate for firms ending their tax-holiday period from 40 percent to 10 percent. The share of manufacturing value added accounted for by pioneer firms rose from an average of 53 percent in the first half of the 1970s to about 64 percent in the second half of the 1980s. More generally, depreciation provisions became more generous after 1979, and the statutory corporate tax rate fell from 40 percent to 33 percent in 1986 and to 32 percent in 1989. 13 We quantify the tax effects below.
Finally, the government directed substantial credit to favored firms. In the 1970s, government loans to foreign investors, GLCs, and commercially-oriented SBs amounted to about 20 percent of the total stock of bank loans to the private sector (these figures exclude sizeable housing loans). The average interest rate on these government-directed commercial loans was about 3 percent less than the bank-lending rate used by
Hsieh. (In the 1980s, the government stopped publishing the interest rate information.)
Inflows of FDI were the same order of magnitude as bank loans, and rose markedly over the 1970s and 10 The Economist Intelligence Unit (1993) states: "Singapore's government relies heavily on incentives to attract foreign investment…. Investment incentives include tax holidays and concessions, accelerated depreciation schemes, favourable loan conditions, equity participation and high-quality industrial estates…" Burton (1995) claims that GLCs' "costs of capital are usually lower than for companies in the private sector." U.S. Embassy (2001) claims that "GLCs were given preferential rates by DBS Bank, itself a GLC." 11 Ermisch and Huff (1999) and Tan (2001) discuss the implicit land subsidy. In Schein's (1996) case studies, negotiations between the government and foreign investors over leases for favorable land parcels figure prominently. 12 Negotiated terms are not public, so one cannot easily quantify these incentives. Even if foreign companies faced competition in export markets, the measures likely reduced production costs and allowed for economic profits. 13 Sources for this paragraph are Fordham (1992) , Commerce Clearing House (various dates), Low et al (1993, p355), 1980s. As a financing source, FDI inflows plus the change in government loans amounted to about 80 percent of the change in bank loans to the private sector in the 1970s; this ratio rose to nearly 120 percent in the 1980s. The increase reflected FDI, since the quantity of government loans declined over the 1980s.
III. Adjusting for Corporate Taxes
Before quantifying the role of profits and heterogeneity in explaining the dual-primal gap, we assess whether capital taxes are quantitatively important. Hsieh recognizes that taxes might matter, but he was unable to obtain reliable tax information. He suggests that abstracting from taxes probably does not drive results, since Singapore's corporate-tax assessments rose relative to GDP. This rising ratio is not surprising, however, since corporate net income rose rapidly relative to GDP. For example, net income as reported by corporations rose from 11 percent of GDP in 1970 to 28 percent by 1980.
Tax rates tell a different story. Figure 1 .A shows the statutory rate (marked with an x) and two measures of averages taxes paid (i.e., taxes relative to income): from Inland Revenue Authority Reports (filled squares)
and from financial reports of corporations (triangles). The three measures all decline in the 1980s.
Were tax preferences for targeted firms quantitatively important? The corporate reports allow us to calculate average taxes paid for local-versus foreign-owned firms and by major sector.
14 Figure 1 .B shows that foreign manufacturing firms, who were major recipients of "pioneer" status, paid lower rates, which fell from about 40 percent to under 10 percent by 1990. Other firms' rates fell only to about 30 percent. Foreign manufacturing accounted for about 1/3 of total corporate profits in the 1980s and 2/3 of foreign profits. We thus calculate two tax wedges: for foreign manufacturing, and for everyone else. (Note that some favored firms (e.g., GLCs) received other, non-tax forms of preferential treatment.)
To measure tax wedges, we also need the present value of depreciation allowances, D i . We use the tax for non-pioneer-manufacturing, which was in addition to other, regular allowances. We assume that 40 percent of foreign manufacturing firms received the investment allowance, based on the roughly 60 percent share of manufacturing production accounted for by pioneer firms.
We use the average tax rate for foreign manufacturing, assume that other firms paid the statutory tax rate, and calculate the tax wedges (1 ) /(1 )
For foreign manufacturing, the wedge fell 1.3 percent per year; for other firms, it fell by 0.7 percent per year. 15 Although the decline in statutory rates was smaller than the decline in foreign manufacturing rates, the decline in T i was still large for non-foreign manufacturing because of the increase in D. The overall tax wedge is the capital-weighted average of the two wedges.. Based on net fixed asset data in Singapore Statistics (1992b), we use ¼ as our benchmark for the weight of foreign manufacturing and find that T falls at 0.9 percent per year.
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Thus, the effect on the dual is large for both unfavored as well as favored firms. Nevertheless, it accounts for only about a quarter of capital's 1.6 percentage point contribution to the dual-primal gap, as Table 3 shows. Hence, Hsieh is correct that the tax correction alone cannot explain the full dual-primal gap.
For unfavored firms (a subset of non-foreign-manufacturing), we incorporate the tax-adjustment of -0.7 percent per year into the estimate of ˆU r in the rest of the paper. The 0.6 percentage point difference between ˆF t and ˆU t provides some quantitative evidence of user-cost heterogeneity.
17 Table 3 shows that the tax adjustments for the other NIEs appear small, albeit consistent with the dualprimal gaps from Table 2 . For Taiwan, the contribution is about 0.2 percentage point per year, largely reflecting increases in investment tax credits (κ) in the 1980s. In Korea, the tax wedge contributes about 0.1 percentage point. Tax rates for large companies fell over time, and depreciation allowances became somewhat more generous. But κ (for selected investments) also became less generous. In Hong Kong, the change in the tax wedge contributes nothing to the dual-primal gap: Depreciation allowances became slightly more 14 The appendix details our construction of these series. 15 We estimate the trend in the tax wedge for each type of capital, and then weight by average capital-income shares. Following Hsieh (2002) , we fit a time trend to the data and divide by the mean. One can apply this procedure to data that might occasionally take on negative values, so that one cannot use logs. But taking logs first gives similar results. 16 This calculation is fairly robust to alternative paths for the capital weight. We also confirmed that qualitative results were robust to a wide range of assumptions about depreciation allowances. Note that the declining tax wedge is consistent with a rising corporate tax-to-GDP ratio because (corporate profits/GDP) was rising.
generous over time, but the corporate tax rate also rose slightly.
IV. Measuring the Economic Distortions and Structural Transformation
We now use equation (11) to assess the empirical importance of profits and user-cost heterogeneity for the dual-primal gap. We use international factor share data to estimate cost shares for the NIEs. In contrast with labor's share of revenue, these cost-shares show the structural transformation predicted by theories of trade and Asian development. We then use these figures to estimate profit shares and profits' contribution to the gap. We back out, as a residual, the heterogeneous-cost-of-capital term. Together, profits and user-cost heterogeneity explain much more of the gap than taxes do.
A. Increasing Capital Intensity in the NIEs
Theories that stress the role of international trade in Asian growth predict rising capital shares and falling labor shares. 18 The Rybczynski theorem states that an increase in the stock of a given factor causes increased production and exports of goods intensive in that factor. Romalis (2004) finds that as the NIEs accumulated human and physical capital, their share of world production and exports of capital-intensive goods rose and their share of unskilled-labor-intensive production fell, implying capital's share of costs rose.
Ventura (1997) applies a form of the factor price equalization theorem. If two countries with identical technologies (and no factor intensity reversals) produce goods that differ sufficiently in factor intensities, then trade equalizes factor prices. The capital-intensive country exports capital-intensive goods and imports laborintensive ones. In essence, trade in goods is an indirect way to trade factors of production; return differentials are arbitraged away. 19 Factors have diminishing returns only globally, so small open economies can sustain rapid growth by accumulating factors and shifting production without factor returns changing.
Since the NIEs accumulated capital far faster than skill-adjusted labor, Ventura's explanation also implies rising capital shares and falling labor shares. 20 As Table 4 , line 1, shows, however, (1-s L ) fell over time in Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan-inconsistent with Ventura's predictions and Romalis's results. 17 Unobserved subsidies and other sources of user-cost heterogeneity are also likely to be important, of course.
18 See Feenstra (2004) for a detailed presentation of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, the Rybczynski theorem, factor price equalization, and other related theorems in international trade. 19 Under certain conditions, Ventura's application of factor-price equalization results implies truly constant factor prices. His explanation remains valid, however, as long as factor prices decline at slower rates than factors accumulated. Romalis (2004) , however, emphasizes the empirical failure of the factor price equalization theorem. 20 Ventura's predictions for factor shares are relative to the rest of the world. In BLS or Jorgenson data for the United States, there is little evidence of a trend in factor shares over this period.
Of course, residual capital payments (1-s L ) include any pure profits. To control for these, we combine international data on industry capital-cost shares from Sarel (1997) with data on the industry mix of output to estimate "true" capital shares in cost, α. 
B. Accounting for the Dual-Primal Gap
We now use the implied cost shares to calibrate the role of profits. Section II argued qualitatively that in Singapore, government policy gave some firms market power, low average factor prices, and large profits.
Indeed, Singapore's strikingly low labor share is consistent with this anecdotal evidence. Estimated profits in Taiwan, though small, were negative. The high labor share estimate (¾) drives the negative estimate. Young (2003) argues that a labor share of ¾ overstates the true share: Young (1995) inadvertently overcorrects for (imputed) proprietor's wage income. Thus, we interpret these results for Taiwan (as well as for Korea and Hong Kong) as indicating small pure profits. Obviously, these calculations take seriously that Singapore's labor's share was about a half. The data appendix discusses and defends this figure. However, even if we arbitrarily raised labor's share in revenue to 0.6 in all periods, profits would still explain a gap of 0.5 percentage points per year. Alternatively, if we arbitrarily halved the profit share by raising our estimate of α by 8.5 percentage points, profits would still explain a gap of 0.7 percentage points. In both cases, although s Π would be much smaller, s Π would also be much more negative. The contribution of profits will remain important for the dual-primal gap unless one generates a sharply falling labor share to match the fall in (1-α). Although Young estimates a constant labor share, other data sources suggest labor's share of revenue (though low) might have risen a bit; there is no evidence at all to support a falling labor share. Hence, these calculations appear reasonably robust.
C. Quantitative Corroboration of Large Economic Profits
Anecdotal evidence suggests large pure profits in Singapore. But profits of ¼ of GDP are exceptional.
We confirm the magnitude of profits with a back-of-the-envelope estimate. Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1995) , we use factor shares and the capital-output ratio to back out an implied return to capital including profits. From 1970 From -1990 , the nominal ratio of tangible capital to GDP averaged 2.38; in the mid-tolate 1980s, it was nearly 3. The average depreciation rate δ in Singapore appears relatively flat at 6.7 percent.
Thus, 
The implied value of ( / ) i K + Π is 14 percent-substantially in excess of the corresponding U.S. rate of 6 percent.
Rotemberg and Woodford argue that 6 percent is the U.S. required return to capital, including an equity premium, and implies little if any pure profit. But if, because of capital mobility, Singapore's interest rate were similar to the U.S. rate, then the 'excess' return of 8 percent represents profits. Multiplying an 8 percent excess return by the capital-output ratio again suggests a rate of profit of close to 20 percent.
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Industry estimates also suggest very large profits. Kee (2002) estimates markups and returns to scale for manufacturing industries as in Hall (1990) . He finds that most industries have large markups of price over marginal cost; but few have correspondingly large increasing returns, implying very large profits. Indeed, in a pooled specification, Kee's estimates imply that pure profits exceed 50 percent of value-added.
23

D. How the Dual Missed "Favored" Treatment and Profits?
Why does dual TFP capture the user cost for the unfavored sector only? As section I.C. discusses, a dual user cost based on estimating a single value for (i+δ)q misses favored subsidies and tax treatment. In addition, it is likely to omit profits. Hence, apart from the tax correction discussed in Section III, it should be appropriate for a firm that does not receive subsidies and earns no profits. More specifically, three rate-ofreturn measures are used in Singapore's dual calculation : The earnings-to-price ratio (E/P); an average lending rate; and the return on equity (ROE). All omit subsidies/taxes, and two of the three omit profits.
First, consider the earnings-price ratio. A standard formula (e.g., Brealey and Myers, 1996, p69) says that a company's share price P i is i i i i P E i PVGO = + -the value of a perpetuity yielding E i , plus the present value of growth opportunities-implying that ( )
. Hsieh implicitly assumes we can ignore the second term. With perfect capital mobility, this measure i i is the expected return for the global representative investor, which might be appropriate for a firm seeking private-sector financing. Note that exchange-listed companies earning large pure profits have higher earnings but also higher prices.
Second, the average bank lending rate is also more appropriate for unfavored firms. Young (1998) describes how a heavily regulated "cartel arrangement" kept lending rates above competitive levels. But
GLCs, SBs, and multinationals generally had alternative, likely cheaper sources of funding, including government loans, FDI, and international lending. In the 1980s, for example, only 21 percent of Singapore bank loans to non-bank customers went to heavily favored manufacturing, transport, and communicationswhich accounted for 40 percent of GDP. FDI was a much more important funding source for these firms.
22 Studies for other countries also sometimes suggest that product market distortions lead to substantial economic rents. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) discuss the sharp decline in labor's income share in many European economies from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s. Consider Italy, where labor's share fell from almost 80 to about 60 percent. They attribute the decline to a reduction in labor's ability to capture the rents arising from product market restrictions. For such a large shift in rents to occur, the rents themselves must be large-e.g., for Italy, on the order of 15 to 20 percent of GDP.
Finally, the dual uses return on equity from Singapore's Registry of Companies and Businesses. ROE is the ratio of two easily manipulated elements in firm financial statements; it is an accounting not a market measure. Firms have considerable discretion in reporting intangible assets such as goodwill or brand name, which in turn affects the book value of shareholder equity; firms earning large profits seem particularly likely to report sizeable intangible assets. From 1980-90, the underlying asset figures for non-financial firms alone show a ratio to GDP that averages 4.5-compared with a capital-output ratio of 2.8 in the national accounts.
In sum, we view the ROE figures as a much less reliable measure of the opportunity cost of funds than the E/P ratio or the average lending rate, both of which correspond primarily to the unfavored sector.
V. Two-Sector Framework: Dynamics, Productivity, and Technology
We now assess technology change in Singapore. As a byproduct, we describe how the two sectors and the aggregate economy evolved. As in Section I, with constant returns and perfect competition, the dual measures unfavored-sector technology, ˆU a . Suppose all firms pay the same nominal wage and that all unfavored firms pay user cost R U =R DUAL . From equation (10) 
This is similar to Hsieh's original estimate. In addition to the adjustments just described above, the key differences from Hsieh's calculations are that Hsieh used Young's aggregate labor shares whereas we use sectoral ones, and we measure real factor prices in terms of sectoral, not aggregate, deflators. Had Hsieh calculated dual TFP using Young's wage growth, without ROE, and with taxes, he would have estimated TFP growth of 1.0 percent per year. Hence, technology growth in the unfavored sector is actually higher than Hsieh's comparable dual estimate because of the higher weight on faster-rising wages.
Next, we use the cost-based primal to determine technology growth in the favored sector: 
, we find â is -0.5 percent per year.
What key assumptions and features of the data drive these estimates? In the unfavored sector, constant returns and perfect competition are crucial, since they allow us to use the dual approach. These assumptions seem reasonable, given standard "replicability" arguments for constant returns combined with competition. In 25 Another condition implied by our model is ˆˆ( ) (1 ( 1))( ) ( does not yield the same value as (13)-our calibration is, loosely speaking, overidentified. But the two estimates (1.5 versus 1.75 in the text) are close. In essence, our story is not consistent with any arbitrary sectoral definitions. Placing manufacturing in the unfavored sector, for example, would yield a very large discrepancy between the estimates. Our allocation relied on qualitative evidence alone and allocates each industry entirely into one sector or the other, so the small difference corroborates our calibration. In addition, we verified that equations (10) hold for each sector and that (12) holds in the aggregate. (We used a time-varying profits term in (10); other equations do not appear sensitive to using a first-order approximation, but with large declines in the profit share over time, the approximation is less exact.) the favored sector, we have used accounting decompositions (but not constant returns) to derive factorquantity growth. The strong growth in ˆF l is driven by the increases in favored labor's share, i.e., by ,L F s .
Those increases are driven by the declining profit rate-which, in turn, is driven in the data by the constant aggregate labor share combined with the shift towards capital-intensive sectors. These are robust features of the data. Strong growth in ˆF k is driven by the large gap between strong observed aggregate capital growth and weak estimated growth in ˆU k (which is driven by the flat user cost).
Given the underlying forces in the data that drive the estimates, our quantitative and qualitative results
are not particularly sensitive to the assumptions we have made (see Table 6 ). Increasing F U K K reduces ˆF k , which slightly improves ˆF a . Including the ROE user-cost measure reduces ˆU a negligibly, since the capital-weight is small; it slightly improves ˆF a (because it raises ˆU k and reduces ˆF k ). We also consider the sensitivity to the large estimated profit shares by arbitrarily increasing the international capital-cost-share estimates by 9 percentage points in each sector and by increasing the growth-accounting labor share by 8
percentage points each year. These adjustments each halve the average profit share. The unfavored dual barely changes, since the change in weights is modest. Unfavored and aggregate technology improve relative to the benchmark, but remain strikingly poor; although the profit rate is smaller, its rate of change is larger.
Technology estimates are, however, sensitive to assuming constant returns in the favored sector.
Measured technology would improve if returns to scale were sharply decreasing, γ<1. But decreasing returns would not necessarily imply a more optimistic assessment of Singapore's performance. Suppose each firm has a fixed cost F and increasing marginal cost: Y X F ρ = − . X is composite input, and the parameter ρ<1
The competitive equilibrium, where MC=AC, has γ=1. Government-supported entry barriers shift the firm's demand curve up as well as making it less elastic. If the upward shift dominates the reduced elasticity, then each firm produces more, which pushes γ<1. Subsidies to input use also lead firms to overproduce and push down γ. Thus, in this model, government interventions reduce the efficiency of the economy even if true technology does not change.
Similarly, Restuccia and Rogerson (2004) offer a story in which firms have decreasing returns (e.g., from
Further detail on levels and growth rates of key variables in the benchmark calibration is available upon request.
limited managerial span of control) but differ in productivity levels. Shifting resources away from the undistorted equilibrium-whether towards or away from high-productivity firms-reduces overall TFP and welfare. Hence, Singapore's heavy interventions could have led to falling TFP (and reduced our measured technology) even if it favored high-productivity firms.
Nevertheless, industry estimates for other countries generally suggest constant or increasing returns (e.g., Basu and Fernald, 2001, and Inklaar, 2006) , so we believe constant returns is the right benchmark. For Taiwan, Wade (1990) documents the considerable government intervention, especially for largescale firms in favored sectors. Government intervention, however, does not inevitably lead to high profitsSingapore is the exception to world experience, not the rule. Estimated profits in Taiwan were small. 27 Hence, we attribute most if not all of capital's contribution to Taiwan's dual-primal gap as reflecting capital-cost heterogeneity, consistent with the anecdotal evidence of heterogeneity.
Korea also intervened, but the evidence suggests it did so without creating large profits or heterogeneity in the growth rates of the cost of capital. 28 First, our estimates, as well as Leipziger's (1988) and Kihwan and Leipziger's (1997) firm-level studies, suggest small profits. Second, Korea's transition also had heterogeneous costs of capital, but these different costs appeared to grow at similar rates. In particular, Hsieh notes the different levels of capital cost in Korea when he uses the curb loan rate (the market rate) versus the 26 These results are in part corroborated by Young's finding that technology growth in the manufacturing sector was even worse than that for the aggregate economy. 27 For Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Korea, the estimated contribution of profits from equation (11) is small. 28 Heterogeneity can also reflect differences in user-cost levels, but differing growth rates are a more direct source. discount rate (the "preferred" rate In sum, there are many similarities in the broad development strategies of Singapore, Taiwan, and Korea. But in Korea, the lack of profits and the similar growth rates in favored and unfavored costs of capital resulted in consistent dual and primal TFP estimates.
VII. Conclusions
We show how product and output market distortions, in principle and in practice, resolve two important empirical puzzles regarding Asian development. First, we reconcile divergent estimates of TFP from the dual and primal sides, thereby resolving a controversy that has generated heat but also considerable smoke.
Heterogeneity in the cost-of-capital (reflecting intentional programs to direct resources to particular firms and/or sectors) and large but declining pure economic profits explain much of the dual-primal gap. Second, we reconcile the constant or increasing labor shares in revenue with the intuitive story that rapid Asian growth relied heavily on a shift towards capital-intensive export sectors. The declining profit share allowed labor's share to remain flat or even rise despite a shift (which we document) towards capital-intensive sectors.
We offer a more detailed view of Singapore, an important but poorly understood development case.
After controlling for the economic distortions, technology declined during its fast-growth period-consistent with Young's original findings using TFP. Indeed, Young was, in part, too optimistic: He overstates technological progress in the favored sector of Singapore's economy. Our best estimate is that in the favored sector, output grew nearly 10 percent per year for two decades, with sharply negative technology growth.
Since this was the sector that received most FDI flows, our results raise questions about the value of costly government policies designed to lure foreign investment. For the unfavored sector, on the other hand, we find that technology growth was even better than Hsieh's original dual TFP results for the aggregate economy.
29 Rhee (1997) discusses the dual structure of Korea's financial market.
Finally, our detailed examination of the NIEs provides both important caveats to, and new applications of, primal and dual growth accounting. When undertaking growth accounting for a country or across countries, there is value in carefully constructing both primal and dual measures. Resolving discrepancies can shed light on the underlying structure of the economy, in addition to providing insight into possible mismeasurement. Thus, this paper reinforces the message of a growing body of empirical and theoretical work that recommends looking inside the black box of aggregate growth accounting.
losses, and hence owe no tax; this raises the average rate paid. In contrast, the Inland Revenue measure of assessed income is for firms owing tax, not for all firms, so it excludes this source of volatility. In addition, corporate net income uses accounting measures of depreciation whereas assessed income uses tax depreciation. Department of Statistics, Singapore (1992b Singapore ( , 1995 Singapore ( , 2006 ) also includes book-value estimates of net fixed assets (NFA) in the corporate sector.
Data on U.S. Multinationals are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) annual survey of U.S. direct investment abroad. Files from 1983 onward were downloaded from http://www.bea.gov/bea/ai/iidguide.htm#link12b . Earlier data was obtained (from hardcopy) from the BEA, March 2006. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2002) have an extensive discussion of these data. We thank Ariel Burstein for providing the cross-country average-tax-rate data in summary form.
Return on Equity and Return on Assets
Asset data taken from the Department of Statistics, Singapore (1992a) . This is the report cited by Hsieh as the source of ROE data; but ROA data (not ROE data) are found in the report. Numbers consistent with Hsieh's ROE calculations are found in Department of Statistics, Singapore (1995) .
Present value of depreciation allowances:
To calculate the present value of depreciation allowances in Singapore, we consider the four major types of non-residential capital identified in the national accounts: Machinery, transport equipment, industrial buildings, and other construction. (We exclude residences, even for private investment, on the grounds that a large share of it is presumably owner-occupied rather than business-owned.) We use information on the tax code from Commerce Clearing House (various years) and Inland Revenue Authority (various years). These sources identify the initial and annual allowances, as well as the type of accounting required-declining balance or straight-line. The major changes over the 1970-90 period are (i) in 1978, initial and annual allowances for industrial buildings become much more generous; and (ii) in 1980, allowances for transport and machinery become more generous because of the move from declining-balance to straight-line depreciation.
We assume that other construction received the same treatment as industrial buildings. We also assume firms did not take advantage of accelerated depreciation for equipment, since until the late 1980s it was available only to manufacturing firm, most of whom were foreign and many of whom had pioneer status. A firm with pioneer status (and thus a low or even zero tax rate) would generally prefer to preserve some of the depreciation for the post-pioneer period, when income became taxable. In the mid-1980s, accelerated depreciation for equipment became available to all firms, which would accentuate the rise in the present value of depreciation allowances relative to our conservative calculation, and hence would accentuate the decline in the user cost of capital.
We use a constant nominal interest rate of 8 percent to calculate the present value of allowances D i for each type of capital. We confirmed that results are not sensitive to using other rates (e.g., 6 percent or 10 percent), or to using the actual time series on interest rates used by Hsieh (2002) .
To obtain an overall weighted average D, we weight the separate D i by estimated shares in capital income, calculated assuming a real rate of 5 percent. Results are not particularly sensitive to the specific weights, since allowances for all types of capital became more generous.
Estimating Tax Rate for Foreign Manufacturing Pre-1980
Department of Statistics, Singapore (1992b) provides summary profit/loss statements for Singapore's corporate sector beginning in 1980. These data have net income before tax (or profit/loss) as well as provisions for income tax, from corporate financial statements. These data are available for the entire corporate sector, as well by major industry, and for local-controlled versus foreign-controlled firms. These data begin in 1980. For the 1970-1979 period, Singapore Statistics provided us with selected data for localand foreign-controlled firms; industry income-statement data are not, however, available, though selected balance sheet data are. Conceptually, the overall tax rate for foreign-controlled firms is the share-weighted average of foreign manufacturing and foreign non-manufacturing. We assume manufacturing's share of net profits are proportional to their share of net fixed assets, and assume that non-manufacturing firms pay the same average rate as local firms. These two assumptions allow us to estimate the rate for foreign manufacturing. For the period from 1980 on, the estimated rate is quite similar to the actual rate. We splice the estimated and actual data in 1980. Results in the text appear robust to reasonable alternative choices, such as using the statutory rate for non-manufacturing firms, or using the manufacturing share from 1980.
Tax Parameters for Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan Main source of depreciation allowances and investment tax credits is Price Waterhouse, "Corporate taxes, a worldwide summary." For Taiwan, other sources included Price Waterhouse, "Doing Business in Taiwan," 1989 Taiwan," , 1991 Taiwan," and 1996 , and Deloitte, Haskings, & Sells "Taxation in Taiwan, ROC (Republic of China)" (1982) . Tax rates were obtained by email from Taiwan's Ministry of Finance (April 2006) and from Chou and Wu (1994) . For Korea, corporate tax rates are from Hyun et al (2000) . Other sources were Price Waterhouse's "Doing Business in Korea" (1992) . For Hong Kong, our sources were Ho (1979) and Ho and Chau (1988) . We confirmed the depreciation schedules with Hong Kong's Inland Revenue Department. Further details on our calculations are available from the authors.
Surpluses of Statutory Boards
Current surpluses of seven major statutory boards are from the Economic Survey of Singapore (various issues). The seven are the Housing and Development Board (HDB), Jurong Town Corp (JTC), Public Utilities Board (PUB), Port of Singapore Authority (PSA), Telecommunications Authority of Singapore (Telecoms), Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA), and Sentosa Development Corp (SDC). Singapore Statistics confirmed in personal correspondence (March 20, 2006 ) that current surpluses of SBs that produce market output are included in corporate gross operating surplus.
Miscellaneous Data
Penn World Tables data are from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002) . 1996 was the latest year for which there was data (rgdpch) for all NIEs. To verify the labor share figures used by Young (1994) and Hsieh (2002) , we used the GDP by income components data from Singapore Statistics. These data were produced for the first time in the late 1990s, so they were not available when Young did his work; they are available only back to 1980. Since we want factor shares in output measured at prices received by producers (i.e., prices that include indirect taxes on factors of production, such as property taxes, license fees, motor vehicle registration fees, and so forth), we also used Singapore Statistics data on gross value added at basic prices (part of their GDP by industry data). Finally, we obtained data on self-employment from various Censuses of Population and from Singapore Statistics (1993).
Labor's share is often low in developing countries because self-employment income (e.g., from farming) is allocated to capital not labor. Gollin (2002) reports that after correctly allocating proprietors' income (i.e. self-employment income), labor shares are almost always in the range of 0.65 to 0.8.
Unallocated proprietors' income does not explain Singapore. In data on income components of GDP, proprietors' income was only 10 percent of gross value added at basic prices in 1980 and 7 percent by 1990. Labor's share, which incorporates all compensation including employers' contributions to the CPF and private pension/insurance funds, was 40 percent in 1980 and 45 percent in 1990, so any reasonable allocation of proprietors' income will keep labor's share at around 50 percent. This data source does suggest that labor's share might have edged up a bit over time.
To measure factor shares, Young's figures use the input-output tables, which properly incorporate all capital-related taxes in capital income (i.e., they correspond to gross value added at basic prices). In 1990, the input-output tables have a labor share of 44 percent. (They thus differ only very slightly from the more recently produced GDP-by-income-components data, which incorporate more recent revisions including minor methodological changes.) He then imputes wages for proprietors and unpaid family workers using micro data. Gollin cites Young (1995) as exemplifying the "best approach" to estimating factor shares (Gollin, p. 467) . Despite differences in data sources, his figures are fairly consistent with the incomecomponents data, A few studies have proposed replacing Singapore's actual labor share of 1/2 with a more "normal" labor share of 2/3. (For example, IMF, 2004) One justification, as in Sarel (1997) , is that such shares might better measure true shares in cost. In our two-sector model of Section I, however, it is not appropriate to simply use cost shares-one needs to estimate from the bottom up. (We discuss this further in the appendix on aggregation in the two-sector model.)
In our view, one needs to understand why labor's share is so low: One cannot arbitrarily adjust them because they are out of line with other economies. In any case, adjusting capital's share down doesn't reconcile Young with Hsieh. Young's figures still imply that capital returns fell at nearly 3 percent per year, whereas Hsieh's suggest that the user cost was about constant.
B. Aggregation, TFP, and technology in a two-sector economy
The Divisia index for aggregate output, from the text, is:
Aggregate TFP growth is
The last term in brackets is a weighted average of the contribution of labor to output in the two sectors, minus aggregate labor growth multiplied by labor's aggregate share. We can write out this term as:
The second term on the right-hand-side is zero since, with no pure profits in the unfavored sector,
, so that the overall expression simplifies considerably:
Note that we have used the assumption that all profits are in the favored sector, so that F Π = Π . In essence, the only reason that the aggregate estimate L s l differs from the share-weighted output contribution of the individual sectors is because of profits, which occur only in the favored sector. Now consider the first, capital-growth, term in brackets of equation (15). Noting that (1 )
we can write out this term as:
Putting equations (15), (16), and (17) together, we have equation (12) from the text:
Thus, revenue-share-weighted TFP growth differs from technology growth because of two terms, one of which reflects profits and the other of which reflects reallocations of capital across uses. Using a cost-shareweighted aggregate residual would change the form of these terms but would not eliminate them. In particular, following a similar analysis, one finds:
where Π Σ and K Σ reflect reallocations of inputs across uses:
The first reallocation term represents shifts of resources towards sectors where the profit rate is higher, i.e., where the share of the sector in output exceeds the share in cost. Economically, this reflects that output is measured using relative market prices not relative costs of production. With differential profit rates, relative prices need not equal relative costs of production (i.e., the marginal rate of substitution is not equal to the marginal rate of transformation). Output is (quite appropriately) aggregated using prices, which are equated to marginal rates of substitution, not using marginal rates of transformation.
The second reallocation term reflects the fact that if capital is shifted to where it has a higher cost-ofcapital, aggregate output and aggregate TFP rises, other things equal. With a higher cost-of-capital, firms' cost-minimizing conditions for capital input use imply that the marginal product of capital is higher. Reallocating resources to where their marginal products are higher raises aggregate output.
C. Systematic National Accounting Errors?
In principle, systematic errors in the national accounts could reconcile the primal and the dual. Hsieh (2002) suggests that the national accounts overstate growth in the capital-output ratio by about 3 percentage points per year. Hsieh's example of national accounting errors concerns output rather than investment: Singapore uses a low, subsidized rental rate to measure the service flow from owner-occupied housing. 30 This suggests that the accounts might understate nominal housing, though not necessarily its real service flow, which rose 11 percent per year from . Suppose mismeasured housing services caused us to understate true output growth by 3 percent per year from the mid-1960s to 1990. Then by 1990, true output would have been more than twice its measured level (i.e., 3 percent compounded for 25 years)-making Singapore by far the richest country in the world, with owner-occupied housing accounting for over half of GDP. Singapore was quite wealthy by 1990, but these counterfactuals seem implausible.
31
Could Singapore instead have overstated capital growth by 3 percentage points per year? Suppose there were growing errors in real investment from the mid-1960s on. Like most countries, Singapore measures expenditure from ongoing surveys of its components. Large errors in the investment surveys would not be offset by large errors in the consumption surveys. Hence, both output and the GDP deflator would also be mismeasured (and incorrect when used for the dual). But Singapore uses different surveys to measure GDP from the expenditure, output, and income sides. If expenditure-based nominal GDP were mismeasured, then there would counterfactually be a large and growing statistical discrepancy.
Might the investment deflator grow too slowly? After adjusting the machinery and equipment deflator for exchange-rate changes, the growth in Singapore's deflator rises about 2 percentage points per year faster than the U.S. deflator from 1970-1990-consistent with Singapore not incorporating hedonic adjustments into their deflators.32 Hence, Singapore plausibly understates rather than overstates real investment growth.
A more plausible way to reduce capital growth is to raise the initial level of investment. In the 1960s, gross fixed capital formation averaged 18 percent of GDP; this share rose to 36 percent in the 1970s and to 40 percent in the 1980s. Suppose we raised the share of investment in GDP to 36 percent for each year from [1960] [1961] [1962] [1963] [1964] [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] Nevertheless, such an increase in initial investment and capital seems unlikely. First, it implies, counterfactually, a statistical discrepancy averaging 18 percent of GDP in the 1960s; the actual discrepancy was fairly small (see Young, 1998) . Second, the 1960s were a time of political upheaval and civil unrest, so the investment climate was not particularly favorable relative to the '70s and '80s. Third, Young (1995) uses data on residential construction and retained imports of cement to extend structures investment back to 1947; those figures do not suggest widespread errors in the initial capital or investment values in the 1960s. Finally, Hsieh provides no evidence of major underestimates of initial investment and capital.
In sum, Hsieh has identified an interesting puzzle. But before relying on the unsupported hypothesis of largescale national accounting errors, one needs to assess other probable explanations. 30 If marginal rates of substitution reflect the subsidized rate then Singapore's treatment is appropriate. But if subsidized housing is quantity-rationed, then this rate is not the right shadow value. 31 Non-housing TFP growth is virtually identical to overall TFP growth. Non-housing output rises 0.1 pp per year more slowly from 1970-1990 than overall output; non-housing capital grows 0.1 pp per year faster. In addition, labor's share of income increases by 0.02 (since housing services are part of capital income), so on balance, share weighted inputs rise about 0.1 pp per year more slowly. 32 In personal correspondence (March 23, 2006), Singapore Statistics confirmed that they have not implemented any hedonic adjustments to their investment deflators. Notes: Column (1) is average annual log-change in "rgdpch" from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002) . Columns (2) and (3) are from Young (1998) for Singapore and Young (1995) Hsieh (2002) and are approximately . Lines (1b) and (2b) are the averages across the different measures reported by Hsieh (for which sample periods occasionally differ slightly). For Singapore, Young's primal data is taken from updated figures in Young (1998) , other data are derived from Young (1995 , Tables V, VII , and IX). Young's tables include data by subperiod for on ŷ , l , k , L s , and K s ; we derive (implicit) growth in real factor prices from L w s y l = + − and K r s y k = + − . We use a weighted average of growth rates over subperiods to adjust Young's numbers to cover the identical time period as each of Hsieh's measures (e.g., for a measurement of the 1973-1990 rate, we would take 7/17 of the 1970-1980 rate and add it to 10/17 of the 1980-1990 rate). The periods are all highly similar and approximately cover 1970 -1990 . When original growth rate calculations are needed (i.e. growth of average labor share), the best approximation to end points are used (i.e. for 1975-1990 growth rates, the calculation might use the 10-year growth from the average during the 1970-1980 period to that during 1980-1990) . For Taiwan, data exclude agriculture and include Young's adjustment of public sector output. Numbers may not add up due to rounding. Notes: Line 1 is the capital shares used by Young (1995 Young ( ,1998 and also by Hsieh (2002) . Line 3 is calculated as a weighted average of Sarel's (1997) capital share estimates, with the weights determined by the industry-share of GDP (1-digit SIC from the CEIC database). Line 7, the estimated profit share of revenues, is calculated as (1 ) Taiwan's profit rate was negative and becoming more negative, we report the average change in the profit rate divided by the absolute value of the mean profit rate.) Finally, the capital share in revenues (line 5) is equal to Young's capital share (line 1) minus the estimated profit share (line 7). Numbers may not add up due to rounding. Notes: Using the calculations in Tables 2 and 3 , plus the disaggregation of the capital-payments contribution to the dual-primal gap in equation (7), and finally taking into account the gap attributable to the tax correction, we calculate lines 1 through 4 above. Numbers may not add up because of rounding. . Column (B) includes Hsieh's ROE-based measurement of the cost of capital in the average used to generate ˆU r . Column (C) increases the ratio of favored to unfavored capital from 2 to 4. Column (D) halves the aggregate profit share by arbitrarily increasing the capital share of costs (taken from international data) by 9 percentage points in every 1-digit sector. Column (E) halves the aggregate profit share by arbitrarily increasing the labor share of revenue estimate used in both the primal and dual by 8 percentage points. Numbers may not add up due to rounding. Notes: Sources are Inland Revenue Authority (various years) and Department of Statistics, Singapore (1992b Singapore ( , 1995 Singapore ( , and 2006 . Pre-1980 foreign manufacturing is estimated.
